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Abstract. The widespread adoption of Internet of Things has led to many secu-
rity issues. Recently, there have been malware attacks on IoT devices, the most
prominent one being that of Mirai. IoT devices such as IP cameras, DVRs and
routers were compromised by the Mirai malware and later large-scale DDoS at-
tacks were propagated using those infected devices (bots) in October 2016. In
this research, we develop a network-based algorithm which can be used to detect
IoT bots infected by Mirai or similar malware in large-scale networks (e.g. ISP
network). The algorithm particularly targets bots scanning the network for vul-
nerable devices since the typical scanning phase for botnets lasts for months and
the bots can be detected much before they are involved in an actual attack. We
analyze the unique signatures of the Mirai malware to identify its presence in an
IoT device. The prospective deployment of our bot detection solution is discussed
next along with the countermeasures which can be taken post detection. Further,
to optimize the usage of computational resources, we use a two-dimensional (2D)
packet sampling approach, wherein we sample the packets transmitted by IoT
devices both across time and across the devices. Leveraging the Mirai signatures
identified and the 2D packet sampling approach, a bot detection algorithm is pro-
posed. Subsequently, we use testbed measurements and simulations to study the
relationship between bot detection delays and the sampling frequencies for de-
vice packets. Finally, we derive insights from the obtained results and use them
to design our proposed bot detection algorithm.
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1 Introduction
The Internet of things (IoT) [1] refers to the network of low-power, limited process-
ing capability sensing devices which can send/receive data to/from other devices using
wireless technologies such as RFID (Radio Frequency Identification), Zigbee, WiFi,
Bluetooth, 3G/4G etc. IoT devices are being deployed in a number of applications
such as wearables, home automation, smart grids, environmental monitoring, infrastruc-
ture management, industrial automation, agricultural automation, healthcare and smart
cities. Some of the popular platforms for IoT are Samsung SmartThings (consumer IoT
for device management) and Amazon Web Services IoT, Microsoft Azure IoT, Google
Cloud Platform (enterprise IoT for cloud storage and data analytics). The number of IoT
devices deployed globally by 2020 is expected to be in the range of 20-30 billion [2].
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The number of devices has been increasing steadily (albeit at a slower rate than some
earlier generous predictions), and this trend is expected to hold in the future.
IoT devices are being increasingly targeted by hackers using malware (malicious
software) as they are easier to infect than conventional computers for the following
reasons [3–5]:
– There are many legacy IoT devices connected to the Internet with no security up-
dates.
– Security is given a low priority within the development cycle of IoT devices.
– Implementing conventional cryptography in IoT devices is computationally expen-
sive due to processing power and memory constraints.
– Many IoT devices have weak login credentials either provided by the manufacturer
or configured by users.
– IoT device manufacturers sometimes leave backdoors (such as an open port) to
provide support for the device remotely.
– Often, consumer IoT devices are connected to the Internet without going through a
firewall.
In a widely publicized attack, the IoT malware Mirai was used to propagate the biggest
DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attack on record on October 21, 2016. The at-
tack targeted the Dyn DNS (Domain Name Service) servers [6] and generated an attack
throughput of the order of 1.2 Tbps. It disabled major internet services such as Amazon,
Twitter and Netflix. The attackers had infected IoT devices such as IP cameras and DVR
recorders with Mirai, thereby creating an army of bots (botnet) to take part in the DDoS
attack. Apart from Mirai, there are other IoT malware which operate using a similar
brute force technique of scanning random IP addresses for open ports and attempting
to login using a built-in dictionary of commonly used credentials. BASHLITE [7], Re-
maiten [8], Hajime [9] are some examples of these IoT malware.
Bots compromised by Mirai or similar IoT malware can be used for DDoS attacks,
phishing and spamming [10]. These attacks can cause network downtime for long peri-
ods which may lead to financial loss to network companies, and leak users’ confidential
data. McAfee reported in April 2017 [11] that about 2.5 million IoT devices were in-
fected by Mirai in late 2016. Bitdefender mentioned in its blog in September 2017 [12]
that researchers had estimated at least 100,000 devices infected by Mirai or similar
malware revealed daily through telnet scanning telemetry data. Further, many of the
infected devices are expected to remain infected for a long time. Therefore, there is a
substantial motivation for detecting these IoT bots and taking appropriate action against
them so that they are unable to cause any further damage.
As pointed out in [13], attempting to ensure that all IoT devices are secure-by-
construction is futile as there will always be insecure devices (with patched and un-
patched vulnerabilities) connected to the Internet due to the scale and diversity of IoT
devices and vendors. Moreover, considering the lack of full-fledged operating systems,
low power requirements, resource constraints and presence of legacy devices, it is prac-
tically unfeasible to deploy traditional host-based detection and prevention mechanisms
such as antivirus, firewalls for IoT devices. Therefore, it becomes imperative that the
security mechanisms for the IoT ecosystem are designed to be network-based rather
than host-based.
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In this research, we propose a network-based algorithm which can be used to detect
IoT bots infected by Mirai-like malware (which use port-based scanning) in large-scale
networks. Bots scanning the network for vulnerable devices are targeted in particular
by our algorithm. This is because the scanning and propagation phase of the botnet
life-cycle stretches over many months and we can detect and isolate the bots before
they can participate in an actual attack such as DDoS. If the DDoS attack has already
occurred (due to a botnet), detecting the attack itself is not that difficult and there are
already existing methods both in literature and industry to defend against such attacks.
Moreover, our algorithm is practical in terms of utilization of computational resources
(such as CPU processing power, memory). For example, ISP (Internet Service Provider)
network operators can use the proposed algorithm to identify infected IoT devices in
their network. The operators can then take suitable countermeasures such as blocking
the traffic originating from IoT bots and notifying the local network administrators.
Actions that can be taken post bot detection are further discussed in a later section. The
major contributions of this paper are listed below:
1. We have analyzed the traffic signatures produced by Mirai malware infecting IoT
devices through testbed experiments. Further, we have identified specific signatures
which can be used to positively detect the presence of Mirai and similar malware in
IoT devices. These signatures are similar to the observations reported in [14] based
on their analysis of the Mirai source code.
2. We have proposed an algorithm to detect Mirai-like IoT malware bots in large-scale
networks. The algorithm is based on a novel two dimensional sampling approach
where the device packets are sampled across time as well as across the devices.
The rest of the contents of this paper are organized as follows. In Section 2, we
review few prominent works on detecting botnets exploiting CnC communication fea-
tures and intrusion detection systems for IoT. Subsequently, in section 3, we explain the
operation of Mirai, extract important features from the traffic generated by Mirai bots in
a testbed and present a detailed analysis of those features towards detecting Mirai-like
bots. Section 4 presents the network deployment of our bot detection solution. It also
includes the formulation of the optimization problem resulting from detection of IoT
bots along with the constraints imposed by limited computational resources followed
by the proposed bot detection algorithm. Finally, the algorithm is numerically evaluated
and the results are presented in section 5.
2 Related Work
There are several works in the literature on detecting botnets using their CnC com-
munication features. We list a few prominent ones in this section. The authors in [15]
present machine-learning based classification methods to detect CnC traffic of IRC (In-
ternet Relay Chat) botnets by differentiating between IRC and non-IRC traffic and then
differentiating between bot and real IRC traffic. Bothunter [16] builds a bot infection
dialog model using the network communication flows between internal hosts and exter-
nal entities during successful bot infections. Three bot-specific sensors are constructed
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based on the dialog model and correlation is performed between inbound intrusion/s-
can alarms and the infection dialog model to generate a consolidated report. Spatio-
temporal similarities between bots in a botnet in terms of bot-CnC coordinated activities
are captured from network traffic and leveraged towards botnet detection in a local area
network in Botsniffer [17]. In BotMiner [18], the authors have proposed a botnet de-
tection system which clusters similar CnC communication traffic and similar malicious
activity traffic, and uses cross cluster correlation to detect bots in a monitored network.
It is claimed to be independent of CnC protocol and structure with no requirement of a
priori knowledge about the botnets. A system for detecting covert P2P (Peer-to-Peer)
botnets has been proposed in [19]. After extracting the statistical CnC communication
features for P2P botnets, the botnet detection system utilizes them to distinguish be-
tween legitimate and malicious P2P traffic.
There has also been some research on intrusion detection and anomaly detection
systems for IoT. A whitelist-based intrusion detection system for IoT devices (Heim-
dall) has been presented in [20]. Heimdall is based on dynamic profile learning and
is designed to work on routers acting as gateways for IoT devices. The authors in
[21] propose an intrusion detection model for IoT backbone networks leveraging two-
layer dimension reduction and two-tier classification techniques to detect U2R (User-
to-Root) and R2L (Remote-to-Local) attacks. In a recently published paper [22], deep-
autoencoders based anomaly detection has been used to detect attacks launched from
IoT botnets. The method consists of extraction of statistical features from behavioral
snapshots of normal IoT device traffic captures, training of a deep learning-based au-
toencoder (for each IoT device) on the extracted features and comparison of the recon-
struction error for traffic observations with a threshold for normal-anomalous classifi-
cation. The proposed detection method was evaluated on Mirai and BASHLITE botnets
formed using commercial IoT devices.
While a number of above anomaly detection works leverage ML (machine learning)-
based approaches, there are several issues associated with them [23]. One of the major
issues is the occurrence of false positives. Even a small percentage of false positives,
e.g. 1% which is considered acceptable in academic research on anomaly detection, can
lead to thousands of alerts per day based on the traffic volume processed [24]. Both false
positives and false negatives have costs (e.g. financial expenses for an organization) as-
sociated with them, with the cost associated with false negatives typically being much
higher. Second, many research works on anomaly detection using ML fail to explain
why a particular ML algorithm would perform well in the system under consideration.
Third, many ML algorithms are suitable for offline batch operations rather than low-
latency real-time detection. Finally, instead of starting with the premise of using ML
approach for a detection task which is a common flaw in anomaly detection research,
one should carry out a neutral evaluation of all the available tools for the task and then
decide on the most appropriate one.
Our work addresses a few important gaps in the literature when it comes to dis-
tinguishing between legitimate and botnet IoT traffic. First, almost all the works cited
above on detecting botnets using their CnC communication features [15–18] utilize all
the packets transmitted by all the devices in a monitored network for a specific time pe-
riod towards designing a botnet detection solution. This approach is highly impractical
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if the resulting solution is to be deployed for IoT devices in real world networks. The
reason is that processing all the packets for all devices in a large network would require
a lot of computational resources. Second, our focus is not only on detecting bots em-
ploying IRC-based CnC communications as done in [15]. The bot detection algorithm
proposed by us in Section 4.2 is independent of the bot-CnC communication protocol.
Third, we do not aim to detect botnets (networks of bots) but instead, individual bots.
Therefore, we don’t require computationally expensive clustering algorithms as used
in [17, 18].
Fourth, we do not extract CnC communication features and use them to identify
bot-CnC communications as done in [17–19]. This is because we aim to detect bots
infected by Mirai-like IoT malware, towards which much simpler features can be used
as discussed in Section 3.3. Fifth, unlike [22], we aim to detect IoT bots much before the
actual attack, during the scanning phase itself as explained in Section 4. Finally, most
of the above cited works use quantifiers such as detection rate and false positive rates to
evaluate the performance of their proposed botnet detection solutions. Instead, we use
a quantity called average detection delay (defined in Section 4.2) for the performance
evaluation of our proposed bot detection solution since the features used by our solution
eliminate the possibility of inaccurate detections or false positives. To the best of our
knowledge, there are no existing papers on detecting IoT bots compromised by Mirai
or its variants which exhibit TELNET port-based scanning behavior.
3 Mirai Traffic Analysis
Detecting IoT devices compromised by Mirai-like malware requires us to analyze the
packet traffic generated by those devices and extract some features to aid us in detection.
In this section, we begin with a brief description the operation of Mirai to make the
readers familiar with some of the related terms. Later, we present a testbed that we use
to emulate IoT devices, infect them with Mirai and capture the packet traffic generated
from them. Finally, we present the extracted features and analyze them in detail with
respect to identifying Mirai bots.
3.1 Mirai Operation
The Mirai [25] setup consists of three major components: bot, scanListen/loading server,
and theCnC (Command-and-Control) server. TheCnC server also functions as a MySQL
[26] database server. User accounts can be created in this database for customers who
wish to hire DDoS-as-a-service. The operation of Mirai is illustrated in Fig. 1. Once
an IoT device is infected with Mirai (and becomes a bot), it first attempts to connect to
the listening CnC server by resolving its domain name and opening a socket connec-
tion. Thereafter, it starts scanning the network by sending SYN packets to random IP
addresses and waiting for them to respond. This process may take a long time since the
bot has to go through a large number of IP addresses. Once it finds a vulnerable device
with a TELNET port open, it attempts to open a socket connection to that device and
emulates the TELNET protocol. Then it attempts to login using a list of default cre-
dentials and if working credential is found, it reports the IP address of the discovered
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device and the working TELNET login credentials to the listening scanListen server.
The scanListen server sends that information to the loader which again logs in to the
discovered device using the details received from the scanListen server. Once logged
in, the loader downloads the Mirai bot binary to that device and the new bot connects
to the CnC server and starts scanning the network.
Fig. 1: Operation of various components of Mirai (Source: Radware [27])
3.2 Testbed Description
The testbed shown in Fig. 2 was configured on an isolated computing cluster. Each
cluster node has two Intel Xeon E5-2620 processors, 64 GB DDR4 ECC memeory and
runs Ubuntu 14.04 LTS standard image. The testbed consists of a local authoritative
DNS server, a CnC (Command-and-Control) server and a server for scanListen and
loading utility, all connected to a single LAN. The IoT gateways are connected to the
above LAN through routers and behind the gateways are QEMU [28]-emulated IoT
devices (Raspberry Pi). We chose this gateway-IoT device topology since it is used in a
number of IoT deployments (such as IP cameras, smart lighting devices, wearables etc.).
The testbed also includes few non-IoT devices (PCs) to reflect real-world networks. As
per our information, this is the first controlled testbed to emulate the true behavior
of Mirai malware. It can be modified to add more nodes, study a different network
topology and test more advanced versions or derivatives of Mirai malware.
3.3 Mirai Traffic Features
We infected the emulated IoT devices in our testbed with Mirai and captured a total
of 1,583,623 packets transmitted by the devices. An analysis of the captured packets
reveals the following features/signatures:
– The scanning packets are all TCP SYN (synchronization) packets.
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Fig. 2: Testbed used to emulate Mirai behavior
– The destination port numbers of scanning packets are distributed as ∼90% port 23
and ∼10% port 2323. No other port numbers are observed.
– There is a periodic exchange of keep alive messages (PSH+ACK) between the bot
and the CnC server. PSH refers to a push message and ACK refers to acknowledge-
ment.
Both ports 23 and 2323 are assigned for TELNET applications [29, 30]. The TEL-
NET [31] protocol is used for bidirectional byte-oriented communication. In the most
widely used implementation of TELNET, a user with a terminal and running a TEL-
NET client program, accesses a remote host running a TELNET server by requesting
a connection to the remote host and logging in by providing its credentials. The most
common application of TELNET is for configuring network devices such as routers.
Now, IoT devices operate by continuously transmitting sensed data to and receiving
commands from cloud servers through a gateway over a secure communication chan-
nel without external human input [32]. We claim that an IoT device is unlikely to be
used to access or configure another device using TELNET, and therefore in the absence
of malware infection, IoT devices should not open TELNET connections to any other
device.
To verify our claim that uninfected IoT devices are not expected to open TELNET
connections, the following experiment was conducted. We configured a Raspberry Pi 3
(Model B+) to act as a gateway and connected it to several real-world IoT devices such
as IP cameras (D-Link), motion sensors (D-Link), smart bulbs (Philips Hue), smart
switches (WeMo) and smart plugs (TPLink). We left the devices connected for a long
time and for each device type mentioned above, we captured around 10,000 packets
per device at the gateway interface. Later, the captured packets were analysed using
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Wireshark [33] and no SYN packets with destination ports 23 or 2323 were found.
Thus, if a SYN packet from an IoT device with destination port number 23 or 2323
is received, it is sufficient evidence to conclude with certainty that the IoT device is
infected with a Mirai-like malware. The above experiment also help us to rule out false
positives, if any at all, if we use the identified scanning traffic signatures, which is a
substantial advantage when it comes to practical intrusion detection.
The third Mirai signature related to keep-alive messages is not required since the
port-scanning signatures is sufficient for detection with certainty. We may require the
third signature to detect more advanced malware which do not use TELNET port-based
scanning. It needs to be emphasized here that the TELNET port-scanning signatures can
be used to identify not only bots infected by Mirai but also other Mirai-like malware
such as BASHLITE, Remaiten, Hajime etc. which employ similar TELNET port brute
forcing technique.
4 Mirai-like IoT Malware Bot Detection
The bot scanning traffic analyzed in the previous section can be detected using sim-
ple firewalls. However, since IoT devices are usually resource-constrained, they do not
have firewalls installed on them. Moreover, network-level firewalls (protecting comput-
ers in a LAN/WAN/intranet) are usually not configured to block TELNET traffic. In
this section, we discuss the network deployment of our bot detection solution. Further,
we formulate the optimization problem arising out of detecting IoT bots with the ac-
companying computational resource constraints. Further, we propose an algorithm for
bot detection based on our analysis.
4.1 Bot Detection Solution Deployment
It is proposed that our Mirai-like bot detection solution be run on the edge gateway
connected to IoT devices or the aggregation router connected directly to the gateway.
Assuming that we run the bot detection solution on the router, a prospective network
deployment for our solution is shown in Fig. 3. The incoming packets at the router are
arranged and stored in buffers according to their source devices.
We process only IoT device packets at the router, whereas the aggregate router traf-
fic consists of IoT as well as non-IoT traffic (PCs, smartphones etc.) The authors in [34]
distinguish between traffic generated by IoT and non-IoT devices from a single TCP
session by analyzing user-agent HTTP property for smartphones and single-session bi-
nary classifiers for PCs. A classification accuracy of 100% for smartphones and false
positive, negative rates of 0.003 each for PCs were claimed to be achieved. We can use
their methods to distinguish between IoT and non-IoT device packets using a single
session worth of packets. Further, once we identify a device as belonging to IoT or non-
IoT type, we can continue to use this information in the future as the device type is not
expected to change.
It is assumed that the ISPs already have access to the information regarding vul-
nerable and non-vulnerable devices. As explained earlier in Section 4.2, IoT devices
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installed in home environments can be regarded as vulnerable while the devices in-
stalled in enterprise/industrial/government networks can be deemed as non-vulnerable.
We expect the firmware running on bot detection routers to be upgradeable so that in
future, if more advanced bot detection algorithms are designed (e.g. for IoT malware
which do not just rely on port based scanning), the corresponding software updates can
be easily pushed to those routers.
Once the bots are detected by our proposed algorithm, the next step is to take miti-
gating actions to prevent the bots from spreading further damage. The network admin-
istrator can block the entire traffic originating from bots and bring them back online
only after it is confirmed that the malware has been removed from those IoT devices.
The concerned ISP can inform the device owners and ask them to secure their device
(by using strong usernames/passwords, placing the device behind a firewall etc.). An-
other defense mechanism is that instead of blocking all the traffic, the bot can be al-
lowed communications with a few secure domains for remediation of malware infec-
tion. This strategy has been mentioned as part of the bot remediation techniques [35]
recommended for ISPs by IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force). The bot can also be
placed under continuous monitoring and all other communication except that required
for the underlying IoT device to function can be denied. Finally, security personnel can
exploit bugs in the bot binary to disinfect them remotely.
Fig. 3: Prospective network deployment for proposed bot detection solution
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4.2 Formulation of Optimization Problem
Processing all the incoming packets at the bot detection router to check if they origi-
nated from an IoT device and subsequently matching those packets against the Mirai
traffic signature would require a lot of memory. To give an example, considering 10,000
IoT devices connected to the aggregation router with each device transmitting at 10%
of the peak data rate of 250 kbits/s (according to IEEE 802.15.4 standard for low rate
personal wireless devices), we need ≈ 9.36GB of storage for a 5 mins traffic session.
However, typically WAN aggregation routers have 1-4GB RAM and few GBs of ex-
ternal storage only, of which a major part is used in packet routing. Therefore, for our
bot detection solution, we propose to sample only a fraction of the IoT devices per unit
time. However, this approach has the drawback that we may miss the scanning pack-
ets due to the sub-sampling operation. This leads to the formulation of the following
optimization problem to detect infected devices.
Our objective in this optimization problem is to minimize the cost associated with
the delay in detecting a compromised device. We define average detection delay (TD)
as the average time between the first occurrence of a scanning packet and the positive
conclusion that the originating device is infected. Now, some IoT devices in a network
are easier to infect with malware than others. Therefore, we split the IoT devices into
two categories: vulnerable and non-vulnerable devices. Vulnerable devices are the de-
vices which are easier to get successfully infected with Mirai-like malware and added
to the botnet. The devices other than vulnerable ones are non-vulnerable devices.
For example, personal IoT devices installed at homes can be deemed as vulnerable
since they are less likely to be behind a firewall (host-level firewalls not feasible on IoT
devices due to resource constraints) and more likely to have their TELNET ports open
(often owners buy cheap devices in which the manufacturer has left TELNET port open
for remote configuration etc.). IoT devices installed in enterprise/industrial/government
networks can be categorized as non-vulnerable since most likely, they would be behind
a network-level firewall (blocking access to insecure TELNET connections) and they
are much less likely to have to have their TELNET ports open (due to organizational IT
security policies).
We define the sampling frequency for an IoT device as the fraction of the time when
that device is selected for monitoring for possible infection. We also define the sam-
pling matrix, Σ as a matrix with columns representing devices and rows representing
the packets transmitted by those devices. An element of Σ is equal to 1 when the cor-
responding packet has been sampled and equal to 0 when the corresponding packet has
not been sampled.
Further, our optimization problem imposes the following constraints that need to be
satisfied:
– The sampling frequency for a vulnerable device ( f vn ) should be greater than the
sampling frequency for a non-vulnerable device ( f nvn ). This is because vulnerable
devices are more likely to be attacked than non-vulnerable devices and hence they
need to be more frequently monitored.
– The total number of vulnerable and non-vulnerable devices selected within a certain
time period (ρv f vnT + ρnv f nvn T ) should not exceed a maximum number ( fmaxn T ),
where ρv and ρnv are the fractions of total number of devices that and vulnerable
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and non-vulnerable respectively. This is to limit the utilization of computational
resources for if the total number of selected devices is more than an upper bound,
it may require significant amounts of processing power defeating the purpose of
packet sub-sampling.
– The maximum number of vulnerable devices selected at any time should have an
upper bound (Nmaxv ). Similarly, the maximum number of non-vulnerable devices
selected at any time should have an upper bound (Nmaxnv ). This is again to place a
bound on computational resources utilization.
– After a certain number of sampling time units (T ), every device (in the set of all
devices, ΩN) should be covered by the sampling process. This is to ensure that
every device is checked for malware infection within a certain time duration or else
few devices which are infected may be missed by the sampling process.
We propose to minimize the cost associated with the average detection delay while
satisfying the above constraints as follows:
minimize
Σ , f vn , f nvn
αTD( f vn , f
nv
n ,Yv,Ynv)
subject to f vn > f
nv
n
ρv f vn +ρnv f
nv
n < f
max
n
max[Nv{Σ}]< Nmaxv
max[Nnv{Σ}]< Nmaxnv
tstart+T⋃
t=tstart
dev_set(Σ , t) =ΩN
where α is defined as the cost incurred by the bot detection algorithm due to a
unit average detection delay, Nv{.},Nnv{.} denote the number of vulnerable and non-
vulnerable devices selected in Σ at any point of time, Yv is the set of vulnerable devices,
Ynv is the set of non-vulnerable devices, and dev_set(.) is a function that outputs the set
of devices sampled in Σ at a time t. It is to be noted that the above optimization problem
is a combinatorial one and it is computationally hard to find an optimal solution [36].
Hence, we devise a method to numerically solve the optimization problem. The results
obtained from the numerical analysis are explained in Section 5. Based on our findings
through the formulation of optimization problem, we have proposed an algorithm for
detecting IoT bots (shown in Algorithm 1) which is practical in terms of lower number
of packets that need to be monitored for infected device detection. The values for f vn
and f nvn to be used while designing our algorithm will be discussed in our numerical
analysis.
5 Evaluation of Proposed Algorithm
In this section, we analyze the the behavior of average detection delay for vulnerable
and non-vulnerable devices with varying sampling rates. A few important background
details are presented below:
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Algorithm 1 IoT Bot Detection Algorithm
1: Initialize Σ , NUM_PKTS, t.
2: for pktcnt = 1 to NUM_PKTS do
3: if src_dev(recv_pkt) 6∈ list_dev then
4: add_dev_to_list(src_dev(recv_pkt),list_dev)
5: end if
6: add_pkt_to_buf(recv_pkt, dev_buf(src_dev(recv_pkt))
7: pktcnt=pktcnt+1
8: end for
9: while TRUE do
10: sel_dev_set=dev_set(Σ ,t)
11: for i= 1 to length(sel_dev_set) do
12: sampled_pkts(t,:)=dev_buf(sel_dev_set(i), CURRENT_PKT)
13: end for
14: for j = 1 to length(sampled_pkts(t,:)) do
15: if Check_TCP_flag(sampled_pkts(t,j)) = SYN & Check_dst_port(sampled_pkts(t,j))
= 23 OR 2323 then
16: Bot_detected(src_dev(sampled_pkts(t,j))) = TRUE
17: end if
18: end for
19: t=t+1
20: end while
– The set of attacked devices, Φ is selected based on the assumed probability model
for malware attack on vulnerable and non-vulnerable devices. For example, we can
assume the probability of attack on vulnerable devices within a given time duration
(Np packets’ transmission) as p1 and that on non-vulnerable devices as p2.
– The sampling matrix, Σ used in our evaluation has a staggered structure and may
be visualized as in Fig. 4. Since the sampling frequency for vulnerable devices is
greater than that for non-vulnerable devices, the portion of Σ containing packets
transmitted by vulnerable devices has a more dense distribution of 1s than that for
non-vulnerable devices. The structure of the matrix also ensures that every device
is sampled after a certain number of sampling time units as required by one of the
constraints in the optimization problem presented in Section 4.2.
– We form a scanning matrix with size as (number of IoT devices) × (number of
packets transmitted). The matrix uses 0 to represent a normal IoT device packet
and 1 to represent a malware scanning packet. Only the devices in Φ would have
1s in their corresponding rows in the scanning matrix.
– The elements where the scanning and the sampling matrices are both 1 represent
detected scanning packets. This is because the matching elements would only be
present where the scanning packet transmitted by an attacked device has been se-
lected by the sampling process.
Moreover, we need to form a statistical model for scanning packet arrivals in the scan-
ning matrix. Towards this, we used one of our emulated IoT devices and established a
video streaming server to emulate the operation of an IP camera (IoT device used in Mi-
rai attack on Dyn). Another emulated IoT device acted as a client connected to the video
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Fig. 4: Sampling matrix example
stream. The other emulated devices were configured to have their TELNET port number
23 open and listening for connections. Subsequently, we infected the video streaming
device with Mirai and captured the transmitted packets at its gateway interface using
Wireshark. Our observations from the packet capture are listed below:
– The video streaming packets are transmitted almost continuously. The transmission
is interrupted only by bot-CNC server communication packets, scanning packets
and some other types of packets such as ARP (Address Resolution Protocol).
– The bot scanning packets are sometimes transmitted within short intervals and at
other times they are transmitted far apart as shown in Fig 5.
Based on the above empirical observations, we model the scanning packet arrivals as
a Poisson process, i.e., the inter-packet arrival times for scanning packets are exponen-
tially distributed with the average packet arrival rate calculated from the testbed mea-
surements. At all other times, we assume that normal IoT traffic is transmitted, again
based on above observations.
Fig. 5: Arrival times of scanning packets
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Table 1: Parameter values assumed in numerical analysis
Parameter Value
Nmaxv 40
Nmaxnv 80
fmaxn 0.5
Np 50
Total no. of IoT devices 100
% age of vulnerable devices 40
No. of packets transmitted per device 100,000
Avg. rate of arrival of scanning packets 3386
(per packet elapsed)
The values assumed for the various parameters in our analysis are shown in Table
1. The plot for average detection delay vs sampling frequency for different values of
attack probability on vulnerable devices (p1) is shown in Fig. 6. The detection delay
values are averaged over all the detected devices as well as over a number of trial runs
(1000). The units of average detection delay are in number of packets elapsed while
the units of sampling frequency are in per packet elapsed. It can be observed that the
average detection delay decreases almost exponentially with increasing sampling fre-
quency. This behavior can be intuitively explained as follows. Increasing the sampling
frequency means that the vulnerable devices are sampled much more frequently, which
in turn increases the likelihood of sampling the scanning packets transmitted by infected
vulnerable devices. Once a scanning packet is sampled, it can be positively concluded
that the corresponding source device is infected as discussed in section 3.3. Hence,
an increase in the likelihood of sampling scanning packets should lead to a decrease
in the average detection delay as defined in section 4.2. Further, it can also be noted
from the plot that increasing the sampling frequency beyond a certain value (e.g. ’0.33’
for p1 = 0.5) leads to slower reduction in average detection delay. This suggests that
while designing the proposed Algorithm 1, the sampling frequency for vulnerable de-
vices should be selected towards the upper half of the range of available values but not
too high since higher sampling frequencies will not result in more benefit in terms of
decrease in average detection delay. Instead, sampling frequencies which are too high
may lead to greater consumption of computational resources.
One may observe that the average detection delay values decrease slightly as the
attack probability increases. This is expected since an increase in attack probability
means that more number of vulnerable devices are likely to be infected, thus increasing
the likelihood of sampling the scanning packets transmitted by those infected devices
resulting in a decrease in average detection delay. Lastly, the plots for the three attack
probabilities, p1 = 0.5,0.7,0.9, are quite close to each other, suggesting that changes
in attack probability do not affect the average detection delay vs sampling frequency
behavior significantly.
In Fig. 7, we have illustrated the distribution of average detection delays for vul-
nerable devices for a sampling frequency of 0.2 and attack probability of 0.6 using a
histogram. The distribution closely fits an exponential distribution with a mean of≈ 52,
suggesting that the probability of achieving higher and higher average detection delays
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for vulnerable devices decreases almost exponentially. Vulnerable devices are sampled
at a relatively higher frequency and also have a higher probability of being infected than
non-vulnerable devices. Therefore, scanning packets can be detected with lower delays
in most trials, resulting in higher probability for lower values and lower probabilities
for higher values of average detection delays.
Fig. 6: Average detection delay vs sampling frequency plot for vulnerable devices
Fig. 7: Histogram of Average detection delays for vulnerable devices
In Fig. 8, we have presented the plot for average detection delay vs sampling fre-
quency for different values of attack probability on non-vulnerable devices (p2). The
plot behavior is somewhat irregular near lower sampling frequencies. For higher sam-
pling frequencies, the average detection delay can be observed to decrease almost lin-
early with increasing sampling frequency. The intuitive explanation for the decreasing
behavior is similar to the one given above for vulnerable devices. While designing the
proposed Algorithm 1, a sampling frequency for non-vulnerable devices which is too
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high may lead to lower average detection delay but the corresponding increase in pro-
cessing power and memory requirements may not be desirable since non-vulnerable
devices are not expected to be compromised easily. A sampling frequency which is
too low on the other hand, may increase the average detection delay significantly in
the unexpected scenario when some of the non-vulnerable devices are compromised.
Therefore, the algorithm designers may have to settle for a sampling frequency which
falls in the mid of the range of available values. Fig. 9 shows the distribution of av-
erage detection delays for non-vulnerable devices for a sampling frequency of 0.025
and attack probability of 0.2 using a histogram. The distribution assumes the highest
values for average detection delays between ‘0-10,000’. Thereafter, values taken by the
distribution decrease slowly with increasing average detection delays.
Fig. 8: Average detection delay vs sampling frequency plot for non-vulnerable devices
Fig. 9: Histogram of Average detection delays for non-vulnerable devices
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6 Future Work
We are developing a software prototype of the proposed bot detection algorithm [37]
which will be evaluated on a testbed consisting of physical IoT and non-IoT devices,
gateways, and routers. The network behavior of Mirai will be emulated by replaying Mi-
rai traffic captured from our virtualized testbed. In the future, we would like to develop
solutions for detecting IoT bots infected with malware exploiting software vulnerabili-
ties to hack the devices and add to the botnet. For instance, Linux.Darlloz, Reaper and
Amnesia malware [38–40] use HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol)-based exploits to
perform code injection and arbitrarily execute code on remote devices bypassing au-
thentication. It should be noted here that the packet sub-sampling approach proposed in
this paper is likely to be a part of the bot detection solution devised for such advanced
malware. Finally, some malware may try to evade detection, e.g. by attempting to hide
their scanning activity. It would be an interesting problem to detect such evasive IoT
malware.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an algorithm for detecting IoT devices infected by Mirai
or similar malware. The bot detection algorithm uses Mirai traffic signatures and a
two-dimensional sub-sampling approach. The deployment of our algorithm within a
real-world network was discussed and prospective actions which can be taken after bot
detection were also mentioned. Leveraging measurements taken from a testbed con-
structed to emulate the behavior of Mirai, we studied the relationship between average
detection delays and sampling frequencies for vulnerable and non-vulnerable devices.
Based on our analysis of the plots, we made suggestions regarding the process of se-
lection of sampling frequencies while designing our proposed algorithm. Finally, we
identified few interesting problems stemming out of this research which we would like
to work upon in the future.
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